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Abstract
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the 
international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is implemented by the Nuclear Materials Section of 
the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) 
in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there 
is the research reactor in Espoo, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in 
Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the Olkiluoto 3 reactor under 
construction are being licensed, imported and installed. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their visits to the construction site 
prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that 
nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international 
agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the 
international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In 
addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the 
European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2016 continued to 
demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations. 
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been 
reduced significantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which 
has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is 
approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did 
they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2016. By means 
of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, the stakeholders enabled 
STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection 
days. In 2016, the number of inspection days was significantly higher at a total of 98, 
owing to the system inspections carried out during the year as a part of STUK’s periodic 
inspection programme. In contrast to this, there was no survey campaign to verify the 
design of the planned geological repository, resulting in only 12 IAEA inspection days in 
2016, whereas, the Commission needed 18 inspection days to fulfil its duties in 2016.
OKKO Olli (ed). Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international 
cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2016. STUK-B 211.  
Helsinki 2017. 38 pp. + Appendices 5 pp.
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A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related 
activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such 
positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to 
all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The 
FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification 
system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task as demonstrated twice during 2016.
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2016 was 
focused on nuclear material control: in particular, standard operational procedures were 
addressed within the nuclear regulator departments. At the Nuclear Materials Section, the 
new nuclear materials database was developed in this context.  Due to the need to regulate 
the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository 
site, safeguards instrumentation was under development, in particular the passive gamma 
emission tomography for the verification of spent fuel. 
In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for 
authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production 
or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK also contributed to EU-funded 
projects in Tanzania and Vietnam, respectively. STUK and Finnish Customs finalised 
the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs 
officer training and the updating of the technical equipment and of operational procedures. 
In 2014, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and 
Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting 
the establishment of the Saudi Arabia’s regulatory authority in relation to its nuclear 
energy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and 
security experts continued practical cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.
STUK-B 211
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Preface
Every year, STUK prepares the report on Implementing Nuclear Non-Proliferation in 
Finland. The main task of the report is to inform and share experiences with colleagues 
and interested parties on safeguards implementation. 
In order to get feedback from readers and users, a survey was carried out after the issuance 
of the 2015 report in spring 2016. The feedback is miscellaneous as expected. Some of 
responders were very satisfied with the expected report both in printed and electronic 
versions, but some wanted a shorter and more reader-friendly style.  Some remarks were 
made on the duplication of basic facts in Chapter 2 (presentation of stakeholder and 
safeguards principles) and Chapter 4 (control measures and inspection during the year 
concerning at each of the stakeholders). International cooperation was also discussed in 
several chapters, partly for historic reasons. Chapter 3 presented the main topics of the 
year.
In this new edition, Chapter 2 is shortened but kept in order to present the Finnish system 
to new readers in a concise way. Chapter 4 is moved to present the safeguards activities 
immediately after the introductory part and development work and other activities are 
dealt with later in the report. STUK’s activities with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty and nuclear disarmament are included in report.
The report was compiled by the staff member of the Safeguards Section of STUK, 
internationally known as Elina’s Safeguards Office. The inspectors in the office have 
specific oversight tasks and duties towards individual operators and stakeholders, so all 
staff members contribute to the reporting. The responsible officers for nuclear material 
holders are Henri Niittymäki for Loviisa NPP, Timo Ansaranta for Olkiluoto NPP, 
Tapani Honkamaa for the new Olkiluoto 3 unit, Mikael Moring and Olli Okko for the 
encapsulation plant and geological repository in Olkiluoto, Marko Hämäläinen for the 
Hanhikivi project, Henri Niittymäki and Olli Okko for the Technical Research Centre 
of Finland, and Timo Ansaranta and Henri Niittymäki for small holders. There are 
deputy arrangements in place in order to ensure instant duplicate knowledge. Not all the 
necessary actions and responsibilities, such as licensing and approvals, are covered in this 
list of facility-specific tasks.
In addition, there are several additional tasks, which the Support Programme to the IAEA 
contributes to the international safeguards R&D work. Mr Honkamaa acts as support 
programme coordinator and prepares its annual report and the highlights in this report. 
Mr Moring is responsible for the Finnish National Data Centre to the CTBTO and, of 
STUK’s other departments, Kari Peräjärvi contributes to GICNT and IPNDV activities 
included in this report. 
The restructuring of the report was initiated in autumn 2016, but its compilation took 
more time than expected. As introduced in the report, new international projects were 
launched in 2016 with consumed the limited resources of the Safeguards Section at the 
beginning of 2017. The beginning of 2017 was busy in the Safeguards section as half the 
BTCs and safeguards manuals at facilities were updated during the first half of the year. 
6STUK-B 211
These changes are indicated in Table 1, which is already out-of-date. However, this report 
summarises the main safeguards activities in Finland during 2016. The report is expected 
to correspond to the wishes expressed by the readers. Comments and suggestions are 
welcome to improve it.
The Editor
STUK-B 211
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The regulatory control of nuclear materials, nucle-
ar safeguards, is a prerequisite for the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy in Finland. In order for Finland 
to have a nuclear industry, most of which consists 
of nuclear energy production, it must be ensured 
that nuclear materials, equipment and technology 
are used only for their declared peaceful purposes. 
The basis of nuclear safeguards is the national 
system for the regulatory control of nuclear mate-
rials and activities. Nuclear safeguards represent 
an integral part of nuclear safety and nuclear se-
curity and are applied to both large- and medium-
sized nuclear industry and to small-scale nuclear 
material activities. Along with the safeguards, the 
regulatory process for nuclear non-proliferation 
includes transport control, export control, border 
control, international cooperation, and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials 
and activities that can lead to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear 
materials accountancy, control, security and the 
reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The 
main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards 
system are the facilities that use nuclear materials, 
often referred to as “licence holders” or “operators” 
and the state authority, STUK. A licence holder 
shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the 
state authority shall provide the regulatory control 
to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the require-
ments. The control of nuclear expert organisations, 
technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-
proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a grow-
ing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish 
legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as 
users of nuclear energy. 
1 Implementation of nuclear 
non‑proliferation in Finland
Finland has quite significant nuclear power 
production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear mate-
rials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland 
reside at the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa. Additionally, there is the research reactor 
in Espoo with nuclear materials, as well as a dozen 
minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Most of 
the applied nuclear research and development ac-
tivities are carried out to improve the maintenance 
and safety of the nuclear power plants.
1.1 International safeguards 
agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both these trea-
ties, and also has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
When Finland joined the EU, the bilateral agree-
ments with Australia, Canada and the USA were 
partly substituted with the corresponding Euratom 
agreements (see Appendix 3 for the relevant legis-
lation). 
In 2016, two new agreements on cooperation in 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy for Finland entered 
into force, one with the Republic of Korea and the 
other one with the Russian Federation. Both these 
agreements cover cooperation in scientific and ap-
plied research, exchange of scientific and techno-
logical information, transfer of nuclear material, 
non-nuclear material, equipment and technology 
10
STUK-B 211
as well as the provision of relevant technological 
consultancy and services.  In addition, the new 
agreement with Russia also includes provisions 
for nuclear liability. That is a new feature, which 
was not included in the old agreement that expired 
in 2004. The third agreement was signed with the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The ratification of this 
agreement is in progress.
Finland was the first state where an 
INFCIRC¹/153-type comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement with the IAEA entered into force 
(INFCIRC/155, 9 February 1972). When Finland 
joined the EU (1 January 1995), this agreement 
was suspended and subsequently the Safeguards 
Agreement between the non-nuclear weapon 
Member States of the EU, the Euratom and the 
IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force in Finland 
on 1 October 1995. Finland signed the Additional 
Protocol (AP) to the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 22 
September 1998 with the other EU Member States, 
and ratified it on 8 August 2000. The Additional 
Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, once 
all the EU Member States had ratified it. The 
scope and mandate for Euratom safeguards are 
defined in the European Commission Regulation 
No. 302/2005.
After Finland joined the EU as a Member 
State and thereby subjected itself to the Euratom 
safeguards, a comprehensive national safeguards 
system was still maintained and further developed. 
The basic motivation for this is the responsibility 
assumed by Finland for its safeguards and security 
under the obligations of the NPT, and also to en-
sure fulfilment of the Euratom requirements.
The national safeguards derive their mandate 
and scope from the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act 
and Decree. These were amended in 2008 as a re-
sult of the general constitution-based renewal of 
the Finnish nuclear legislation system. The opera-
tor’s obligation to have a nuclear material account-
ancy system and the right of STUK to oversee the 
planning and generation of design information for 
new facilities was introduced from STUK require-
ments into the Nuclear Energy Decree. 
In 2015, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended 
in such a way that the Government Decrees on 
nuclear safety, nuclear waste management, emer-
gency preparedness and nuclear security were 
replaced by new STUK Regulations. Some general 
features such as on radiation doses were intro-
duced from the old Government Decrees into the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, but most of the detailed 
requirements were included in the new STUK 
Regulations that entered into force on 1 January 
2016 parallel to the amendment of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree.
As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues detailed 
requirements (the YVL Guides) on safety, security 
and safeguards that apply to the use of nuclear en-
ergy. STUK’s safeguards requirements for all users 
of nuclear energy during all phases of the nuclear 
fuel cycle are set in YVL Guide D.1 Regulatory 
Control of Nuclear Safeguards. Areas covered in 
the new comprehensive guide include the obliga-
tions and measures stemming from the Additional 
Protocol for the Safeguards Agreement and from 
recent developments. All stakeholders must de-
scribe their own safeguards system in written form 
(as a nuclear materials handbook or safeguards 
manual), in order to ease their task of fulfilling 
their obligations and to guarantee the effective 
and comprehensive operation of the national safe-
guards system. In the new guide, there are also 
specific national requirements for the disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel in a geological repository. In 
general, nuclear safeguards control applies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual-use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and technology suitable 
for producing nuclear energy or nuclear weap-
ons as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence including information se-
curity
•	 R&D	and	other	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	
fuel cycle as defined in the Additional Protocol
•	 design	 and	 construction	 of	 new	 nuclear	 facili-
ties.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish 
safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish safe-
guards system are the authorities and stakehold-
ers. Undistributed responsibility for the safety, se-
curity and safeguards of the use of nuclear energy 
rests with the stakeholder. It is the responsibility of 
STUK as the state regulatory authority to ensure ¹  INFCIRC = IAEA Information Circulars
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that the licence holders and all other stakeholders 
in the nuclear field comply with the requirements 
of the law and the nuclear safeguards agreements. 
To complement the national effort, international 
control is necessary in order to demonstrate cred-
ibility and the proper functioning of the national 
safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsi-
ble for national non-proliferation policy and inter-
national agreements. The MFA is responsible for 
the export control of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear dual-use items, including sensitive nucle-
ar technology. The Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment (MEAE) is responsible for the 
supreme command and control of nuclear matters. 
MEAE is responsible for the legislation related to 
nuclear energy and is also the competent authority 
mentioned in the Euratom Treaty. Other minis-
tries, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Defence, also contribute to the efficient 
functioning of the national nuclear safeguards sys-
tem.
1.2.2 STUK
As per the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK is 
responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates 
the stakeholders’ activities and ensures that the 
obligations of international agreements concern-
ing the peaceful use of nuclear materials are met. 
Regulatory control by STUK includes the posses-
sion, use, production, transfer (national and inter-
national), handling, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear dual-use 
items. STUK is in charge of Finland’s approval and 
consultation process for inspectors from the IAEA 
and the European Commission. 
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), together with many 
other activities. STUK reviews the stakeholders’ 
reports (operational notifications, inventory re-
ports), inspects their accountancy, facilities and 
transport arrangements on site, and performs sys-
tem audits. STUK runs a verification programme 
for nuclear activities to assess the completeness 
and correctness of the declarations by the licence 
holders. Nuclear safeguards on the national level 
are closely linked to other functions of nuclear 
materials control and non-proliferation: licensing, 
export control, border control, transport control, 
combating illicit trafficking, physical protection 
of nuclear materials, and monitoring compliance 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). Nuclear safety and particularly nuclear 
security objectives are closely complemented by 
safeguards objectives. For this reason, the research 
and regulatory units in the fields of safety, security 
Figure 1. Framework to implement nuclear non-proliferation within STUK’s organisation.
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Public Affairs
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and safeguards at STUK cooperate under the non-
proliferation framework. The scope of non-prolifer-
ation work is linked to many organisational units 
of STUK (Fig. 1). 
The distribution of the working days of the 
Nuclear Materials Section in the different duty 
areas is presented in Figure 2. Most of the working 
days are invoiced to the stakeholders. As seen in 
Figure 2, the duty areas are divided into those of 
direct oversight and inspections (basic operations), 
support functions including maintenance, develop-
ment work for the regulatory functions and consul-
tancy, including international cooperation financed 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or the EU. 
However, the state budgetary funding constitutes 
only about 5% of the total funding of the Nuclear 
Materials Section.
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an 
international domain. STUK therefore actively par-
ticipates in international nuclear safeguards-relat-
ed cooperation and development efforts, and also 
participates in the European SAfeguards Research 
and Development Association’s ESARDA’s working 
groups, executive board and the steering commit-
tee. The practices obtained at the current nuclear 
construction projects have emphasised the need to 
bring in the safeguards requirements at an early 
stage of facility design. The experience has been 
shared with the IAEA, several international fora 
and also in bilateral cooperation with several coun-
tries.
1.2.3 Licence holders and other 
users of nuclear energy
The essential parts of the national safeguards 
system are the licence holders and other users 
of nuclear energy – in nuclear terminology, often 
called the operators and other stakeholders. In the 
Finnish legislation, the term ’use of nuclear en-
ergy’ comprises a wide range of nuclear-related 
activities, such as those defined in the Addition 
Protocol. These stakeholders, in particular the li-
cence holders, perform key functions in the na-
tional safeguards system: control of the authentic 
source data of their nuclear materials in addition 
to accountancy for nuclear materials at the facil-
ity level for each of their material balance areas 
(MBA). Each licence holder or other user of nuclear 
energy must operate its safeguards system in ac-
cordance with its own nuclear materials handbook 
or safeguards manual. The requirements of the 
Additional Protocol are integrated in the handbook 
to facilitate implementation of safeguards at the 
site, including the material balance areas. Other 
stakeholders too, as users of nuclear energy, are 
requested to have a safeguards manual to facilitate 
safeguards implementation. The nuclear materi-
als handbook or safeguards manual is part of the 
operator’s quality system and is reviewed and ap-
proved by STUK.
In Finland, there are about 30 stakeholders 
responsible for nuclear material accountancy and 
control. The major material balance areas are list-
692; 48 %
116; 8 %
453; 31 %
184; 13 %
Distribution of working days
Direct oversight and inspections
Budgetary funding
Support functions
Expert services
Figure 2. The distribution of working days of the Nuclear Materials Section in the various duty areas.
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ed in Table 1 and described more in detail below. 
Most of all nuclear materials in Finland reside at 
the nuclear power plants at Loviisa and Olkiluoto. 
The amounts of nuclear materials (uranium, plu-
tonium) in Finland in 1990–2016 are presented in 
Figures 3 and 4. Currently there are six sites in the 
sense of the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear 
power plant sites, the geological repository site 
in Olkiluoto, and three minor sites: the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland, the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority and the Laboratory of 
Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki. 
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a licence holder or by other stake-
holder as groundwork, the European Commission 
adopts particular safeguards provisions (PSP) for 
that licence holder. PSPs are drawn taking op-
erational and technical constraints into account 
in close consultation with both the person or un-
dertaking concerned and the relevant member 
state. Until PSPs are adopted, the person or un-
dertaking shall apply the general provisions of the 
Commission regulation No 302/2005. A facility at-
tachment (FA) is prepared in cooperation with the 
Table 1. Status of regulatory documents for material balance areas in Finland at the end of 2016, updates in first 
half of 2017 are already indicated.
MBA, location BTC,  
last upd.
Site (AP), 
founded
PSP,  
in force
FA,  
in force
Licence/DiP,  
in force  
(from/until)
SG Manual, 
approved 
WL0V, Loviisa 17.5.2016* S SF L0V1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 4.5.1998 No Operation,  
LO1 until 31.12.2027 
LO2 until 31.12.2030
30.11.2012
W0L1, Olkiluoto 12.3.2016 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operation, until 
31.12.2018
17.11.2016
W0L2, Olkiluoto 12.3.2016 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operation, until 
31.12.2018
17.11.2016
W0LS, Olkiluoto 12.3.2016 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operation, until 
31.12.2018
17.11.2016
W0L3, Olkiluoto 31.3.2016 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
No No Construction, granted 
17.2.2005
17.11.2016
W0LE, Olkiluoto 21.5.2015* S SF POS1, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction, 
12.11.2015
No, included in 
WOLF manual
W0LF, Olkiluoto 23.5.2016 S SF POS1, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction, 
12.11.2015
11.11.2016*
WFV1, Pyhäjoki 6.7.2015  
(prel. DI)
No No No DiP, 1.7.2010 4.7.2014
WRRF, Espoo 31.12.2014 S SF VTT1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 9.7.1998 No Operation, until 
31.12.2023
24.5.2016*
WNSC, Espoo 31.12.2014* No* No No Operation, until 
31.12.2026
14.11.2016
WFRS, Helsinki 10.4.2014* S SF STUK, 
8.7.2004
No No Not required (as an 
authority)
29.10.2015*
WHEL, Helsinki 21.12.2016 S SF HYRL, 
8.7.2004
No No Operation, until 
31.12.2017
30.6.2015*
WKK0, Kokkola 30.5.2013 No No No Operation, until 
31.12.2024
18.6.2015
WNNH, Harjavalta 12.1.2016* No No No Operation, until 
31.12.2019
18.6.2015
WTAL, Talvivaara 29.11.2010 No No No No No, drafted in 
2013
WDPJ, Jyväskylä 14.5.2012* No No No Operation, until 
31.12.2024
24.2.2015*
Finnish material balance areas and their status as 31.12.2016. MBA (material balance area code), BTC (Basic Technical Characteristics, i.e. Design 
Information), AP (the Additional Protocol), PSP (Particular Safeguards Provisions set by the European Commission), FA (Facility Attachment prepared 
by the IAEA), DiP (Decision-in-Principle, date of Parliament approval, in force 5 years). The BTC’s and Safeguards Manuals marked with an asterisk* 
are updated during the first half of 2017.
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Figure 4. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel in Finland in 1990–2016.
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Figure 3. Uranium accumulation in Finland in 1990–2016.
IAEA for each facility to describe arrangements 
specific to that facility. The status of the regulatory 
documents for the Finnish material balance areas 
is shown in Table 1.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
The nuclear power plant operated by Fortum 
Power and Heat is located on Hästholmen Island 
in Loviisa on the southeast coast of Finland. This 
first NPP was built in Finland in the 1970s to host 
two VVER-440 type power reactor units. These two 
units share common fresh and spent fuel storages. 
For nuclear safeguards accountancy purposes, the 
entire NPP is counted as one material balance area 
(MBA code WL0V). 
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union/Russian 
Federation. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was 
returned to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation 
until 1996 and since then has been stored in the 
interim storage due to a change in Finnish nuclear 
legislation, which forbids the import and export of 
nuclear waste in general, including spent fuel.
As per the requirements of the Additional 
Protocol, the Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOV1) com-
prises Hästholmen Island as a whole and extends 
to the main gate on the mainland. Particular 
Safeguards Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which 
define the European Commission’s nuclear safe-
guards procedures for the facility, have been in 
force since 1998. The Facility Attachment of the 
Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been 
prepared by the IAEA for the Loviisa NPP.
Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS, and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and op-
erates a nuclear power plant on the Olkiluoto 
Island in Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. 
The Olkiluoto NPP consists of two nuclear power 
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reactor units and an interim spent fuel storage. 
Olkiluoto 1 was connected to the electricity grid 
in 1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1980. There are three 
active material balance areas (MBA codes W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS) at the Olkiluoto NPP.
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU, and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Germany and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence to 
construct a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3 in 
2005. As a part of the licensing process, TVO’s plan 
for arranging the necessary measures to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons was approved 
by STUK. The construction and assembly work 
of the reactor unit is under way. The European 
Commission has assigned the MBA code W0L3 for 
Olkiluoto 3. TVO submitted the operation licence 
application to the Government in April 2016 with 
the aim of having the unit commissioned in 2018.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLK1) as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol currently 
comprises the fenced areas around the reactor 
units, the spent fuel storage and the storage for low 
and intermediate level waste, and the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site. Particular Safeguards Provisions 
for the Olkiluoto NPP have been in force since 
2007. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
by the IAEA for the Olkiluoto NPP.
Fennovoima (MBA WFV1) 
Fennovoima was founded in 2007 as a new nuclear 
power operator in Finland. The Government ap-
proved a Decision-in-Principle in 2010 for the new 
operator Fennovoima to construct a new nuclear 
power plant at a new site. The preliminary Basic 
Technical Characteristics (BTC) was submitted to 
the European Commission in summer 2013, and 
the MBA code WFV1 was assigned to the future 
material balance area once the selection of the 
future Hanhikivi site at Pyhäjoki was decided. 
Fennovoima submitted the construction licence 
application to the Government in June 2015 and 
consequently, in September 2015, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy launched the pro-
cess to evaluate the application with the desired 
timeline at the end of 2017. The Hanhikivi site (ac-
cording to the Additional Protocol) will be declared 
stepwise as the project proceeds from a virgin 
green site to the preparatory work site and finally 
to the nuclear power plant. The current estimate 
is that the first Hanhikivi site declaration will be 
submitted in 2018.
VTT (MBAs WRRF and WNSC)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located at 
facilities other than nuclear power plants. The most 
significant of those facilities is the VTT research re-
actor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF), located in Otaniemi, 
Espoo. The research reactor was the first nuclear 
reactor built in Finland at the Technical Research 
Centre of Finland (VTT). In 2012, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy and VTT announced 
the plan to close down the reactor and to launch 
the decommissioning process. The reactor was shut 
down and made subcritical in 2015. 
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define the 
European Commission’s nuclear safeguards pro-
cedures for the facility have been in force for VTT 
FiR1 from 1998. The Facility Attachment of the 
Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been 
prepared by the IAEA for the research reactor. 
In contrast to this, a new building, the VTT 
Centre for Nuclear Safety, for experimental nu-
clear research will be built at the Espoo premises 
of VTT. The preliminary BTC for the new building, 
already under construction, was submitted to the 
Commission by the end of 2014 and, consequently, 
the MBA code WNSC was assigned to the future 
material balance area in 2015. In the new build-
ing, some of the experimental research currently 
being carried out in the building containing the 
research reactor will be continued. STUK granted 
the operational licence in November 2017 for the 
VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, but no materials 
were moved to the new building in 2016.  Both 
these decisions will have long-lasting effects, due 
to the need for licences, permits, contracts and en-
vironmental impact assessment. This also affects 
safeguards, as the nuclear materials must be kept 
under the control of competent personnel in both 
material balance areas.
The VTT FiR1 site (SSFVTT1), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, currently 
consists of the whole building around the research 
reactor, although there are non-nuclear companies 
and university premises in the same building.
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Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 910/880 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 910/880 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction licence granted Approx. 1,600 (net) Pressurised water reactor (PWR),
 17 Feb 2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and  
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb1977 9 May 1977 526/502 Pressurised water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 526/502 Pressurised water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Major nuclear installations in Finland
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Plant Supplemented  Nominal electric power, Type,
unit Decision-In-Principle approved net (MW) supplier
Hanhikivi 1 5 Dec 2014  Approx. 1200 Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR),
    ROSATOM
Hanhikivi nuclear power plant FH1 is a power plant project of Fennovoima.
Hanhikivi nuclear facility project 
The planned facility under construction will consist of a surface facility for the encapsulation of spent nuclear 
fuel and a geological repository for disposal of the fuel in the underground at a depth of appr. 420 metres.
Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and geological repository
FiR 1 research reactor 
Facility Thermal power In operation Fuel Triga fuel type  
TRIGA Mark II 250 kW March 1962– Reactor core consists Uranium–zirkonium-
research reactor  June 2015 of 80 fuel rods which hybrid combination:
   contain 15 kg of uranium 8% uranium
    91% zirkonium and 
    1% hydrogen
The FiR 1 research reactor, operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, was commissioned in  
March 1962. VTT stopped using the reactor in June 2015 and placed it in permanent shutdown.
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STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK), mainly materials no longer in use and 
hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK was 
founded in 1958 and has been located at its cur-
rent premises in Roihupelto, Helsinki since 1994. 
The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the STUK 
headquarters and the “Central interim storage for 
small-user radioactive waste” at the Olkiluoto NPP 
site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the premises of STUK’s headquarters located in 
Helsinki. The storage at Olkiluoto is included in 
the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of Helsinki (HYRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. HYRL is located at the Kumpula univer-
sity campus in Helsinki. In 2016, the University’s 
internal structure was reorganised and the current 
stakeholder is the Department of Chemistry.
The HYRL site (SSFHYRL), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, comprises the 
whole building housing the laboratory.
Freeport Cobalt Oy (MBA WKK0)
The by-products of Kokkola Chemicals facility’s 
cobalt purification process contain uranium, which 
qualifies these by-products as nuclear material. 
Kokkola Chemicals has an operating licence to pro-
duce, store and handle nuclear material. In 2013, 
Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. acquired 
the ownership of the OM Group. The current op-
erator is Freeport Cobalt Oy, and the facility is 
located at Kokkola on the west coast of Finland.
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy (MBA WNNH)
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy operates the nickel 
refining plant at Harjavalta in western Finland. 
The plant was commissioned in 1959, expanded 
in 1995 and again in 2002. The refinery of Norilsk 
Nickel Harjavalta employs the technique of the sul-
phuric acid leaching of nickel products. Uranium 
residuals are extracted from the nickel products, 
for example from the Talvivaara mine. In March 
2010, STUK granted a licence to extract less than 
10 tonnes of uranium per year. The Norilsk Nickel 
Harjavalta company submitted the basic technical 
characteristics (BTC) to the European Commission 
in December 2010. 
Terrafame Oy (MBA WTAL)
In 2010, the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd mining 
company announced its interest in investigating 
the recovery of uranium as a separate product 
from its sulphide ore body. The Basic Technical 
Characteristics (BTC) were submitted to the 
European Commission in 2010, and the MBA code 
WTAL is assigned to the future uranium extrac-
tion plant that has been constructed as a sepa-
rate part of the mineral processing plant. The 
production of uranium was expected to commence 
in 2013. However,  Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd filed 
for bankruptcy in November 2014. During 2015 
a new state-owned company Terrafame took over 
the mining operations at Talvivaara. At the end of 
2016, the use of the uranium extraction plant was 
not included in the mining and mineral processing, 
but the MBA code WTAL was still kept available 
for possible future nuclear activities. 
Other nuclear material holders
There are about ten minor nuclear material hold-
ers in Finland. One of them is an actual mate-
rial balance area: the University of Jyväskylä, 
Department of Physics (JYFL, MBA code WDPJ), 
but in fact the nuclear material at JYFL has 
been derogated and exempted by the European 
Commission and the IAEA. Other minor nuclear 
material holders are members of a Catch-All-MBA 
(CAM), for the purposes of international nuclear 
safeguards. Most of these have depleted uranium 
as radiation-shielding material.
Posiva (MBAs W0LE and W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It is owned 
by the nuclear power plant operators TVO and 
Fortum. Posiva has been excavating an under-
ground rock characterisation facility called Onkalo 
at Eurajoki since 2004, and thus preparing for the 
construction of the disposal facility. In the IAEA 
safeguards approaches, it has been suggested that 
the geological formation should be under safe-
guards during the whole lifetime of the under-
ground facility. For this reason, Posiva was required 
to develop a non-proliferation handbook, such as a 
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nuclear materials handbook, to describe its safe-
guards procedures and reporting system already 
before becoming a nuclear material holder. The li-
cence to construct the disposal facility was granted 
by the Government in November 2015. Based on 
the drawings presented in the application, the pre-
liminary BTCs were prepared for both facilities 
separately and submitted to the Commission in 
June 2013. The MBA codes assigned for the future 
facilities are W0LE for the encapsulation plant and 
W0LF for the geological repository. The installation 
without nuclear materials but with the two BTCs 
for these future Material Balance Areas consti-
tutes a site according to the Additional Protocol. 
The Posiva site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area 
around the buildings supporting the construction 
of the facilities. 
Other stakeholders
Nuclear expert organisations, technology holders 
and suppliers that serve nuclear and other indus-
try are obliged to take care that non-proliferation-
sensitive technology does not get into the hands 
of unauthorised actors and thereby contribute 
to nuclear proliferation. The introduction of the 
Additional Protocol (1996) extended the scope of 
safeguards to the non-proliferation control of nu-
clear programmes and fuel cycle-related activities. 
These also include research and development ac-
tivities not involving nuclear materials, but are 
related to process or system development of fuel 
cycle aspects defined in the Protocol. Additionally, 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540 (April 2004) requires every state to ensure 
that export controls, border controls, material ac-
countancy and physical protection are efficiently 
addressed, and calls on all states to develop ap-
propriate ways to work with and inform indus-
try and the public regarding their obligations. The 
control of nuclear expert organisations to ensure 
the non-proliferation and peaceful use of sensitive 
technology and dual-use items is a growing global 
challenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards are commonly seen as the 
traditional nuclear material accountancy and re-
porting system, the main stakeholders of which are 
the international, regional and local authorities 
and the operators. In accordance with the extended 
non-proliferation regime and the amendments to 
the Finnish legislation, the stakeholders, universi-
ties, research organisations or companies that have 
activities defined in the Additional Protocol are 
under reporting requirements and export control. 
These stakeholders (the Technical Research Centre 
and three universities) as users of nuclear energy 
are required to prepare the nuclear safeguards 
manual and to nominate responsible persons for 
nuclear safeguards arrangements.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom 
Safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission 
(Euratom safeguards) both have independent man-
dates to operate in Finland. These two interna-
tional inspectorates have agreed on cooperation, 
which aims to reduce undue duplication of effort. 
The operators report to the Commission as re-
quired by Commission Safeguards regulation No 
302/2005. It is the Commission’s task to audit the 
licence holders’ accounting and reporting systems. 
The Commission shall draw up the particular safe-
guard provisions (PSP) to agree on the means of 
safeguards implementation taking account of the 
operational and technical constraints of the licence 
holder.
The IAEA safeguards include traditional nu-
clear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and safe-
guards activities in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol, integrated together. While this should not 
lead to an increase in inspections, it should enable 
the IAEA to assure itself of the absence of unde-
clared nuclear activities in a state. In practice, the 
number of IAEA routine interim inspections is de-
creasing. In contrast to this, the IAEA additionally 
performs 1–3 short-notice inspections per year in 
a state that has a number and type of nuclear in-
stallations similar to the situation in Finland. The 
IAEA has annually drawn conclusions confirming 
its confidence that all nuclear activities and mate-
rials are accounted for and are in peaceful use in 
Finland.
The number of IAEA and Euratom routine 
inspections decreased significantly in 2009, as 
defined in the state-level safeguards approach for 
Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 and 
2008. At the trilateral meeting (IAEA/EC/STUK) 
in September 2013, it was agreed that no unan-
nounced inspections with two hours’ notice time 
would be performed in Finland after the beginning 
of 2014. Thus, currently all short notice inspections 
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are expected to take place with 48 hours’ advance 
notice (see infobox). STUK continues with annual 
routines consisting of approximately 40 field in-
spections, which enables the effective safeguards 
implementation of the international inspectorates. 
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK must participate when the IAEA and 
Euratom are having inspections at Finnish fa-
cilities, so STUK has increased preparedness for 
short-notice and unannounced inspections and 
complementary access (abbreviated SNUICA). 
Every weekday, one of STUK’s inspectors is pre-
pared to attend a possible IAEA of Euratom in-
spection. 
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials 
and activities are the basis for state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
has been nominated as a site representative, as 
per European Commission regulation No 302/2005. 
STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant 
information and then submits the compiled decla-
rations in timely fashion to the Commission and 
the IAEA.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a 
state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that 
nuclear materials and activities within the state 
are in accordance with the licence holders’ declara-
tions, and that there are no undeclared activities. 
Such methods can provide information on the 
identity of the nuclear materials and confirm that 
licence holders’ declarations are correct and com-
plete with respect to, for example, the enrichment 
of uranium and the burn-up and cooling time of 
nuclear fuel. The technical analysis methods in use 
are non-destructive assay (NDA), environmental 
sampling and satellite imagery.
1.5 Control of uranium and 
thorium production
Mining and mineral processing operations aim-
ing to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
regulatory control. In order to carry out these ac-
tivities, a licence and accounting system to keep 
track of the amounts of uranium and thorium are 
required. A national licence is also required to ex-
port and import uranium or thorium ore and ore 
concentrates. These activities are also controlled 
by the Euratom Supply Agency and the European 
Commission. Mining and milling activities and the 
production of uranium and thorium must be re-
ported to STUK, the Commission and the IAEA. 
1.6 Licensing and export/import 
control of dual‑use goods
As per the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, other nu-
clear fuel cycle-related activities in addition to 
nuclear materials are under regulatory control. 
A licence is required for the possession, transfer 
and import of non-nuclear materials, components, 
equipment and technology suitable for producing 
nuclear energy (nuclear dual-use items). The list of 
these other items is based on the Nuclear Suppliers’ 
Group (NSG) Guidelines (INFCIRC/254 Part 1). 
The licensing authority is STUK. The Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs is responsible for granting NSG 
Government-to-Government Assurances (GTGA) 
when necessary. The ministry usually consults with 
STUK before giving the assurances. The licence 
holder is required to provide STUK with a list of 
the above-mentioned items annually. Moreover, the 
export, import and transfer of such items must be 
confirmed to STUK after the action.
Finland’s export control system is based on EU 
IAEA regular inspections:
Facilities at nuclear power plants (NPP):
•	 Physical	Inventory	Verification	(PIV)	/	Design	
Information	Verification	(DIV)	1/year
•	 Random	Interim	Inspection	(RII)	at	48	h	 
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Spent fuel storages at NPPs
•	 PIV/DIV	1/year
•	 RII	at	48	h	notification	(at	least	1/year)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities 
(LOF)
•	 PIV/DIV	1/4–6	years
New reactors, under construction
•	 DIV	and	PIV	later	like	at	the	NPPs
Repository (Onkalo), under construction
•	 PIV/DIV	most	likely	1	per	year 
Complementary	accesses	at	2/24	h	notification	to	
verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
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Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 
2009, which sets up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit 
of dual-use items. This regulation was amended 
in 2014. The export of Nuclear Suppliers’ Group 
(NSG) Part 1 and Part 2 items is regulated by the 
Finnish Act on the Control of Exports of Dual-use 
Goods. Authorisation is required to export dual-use 
items outside the European Union as well as for 
EU internal transfers of NSG Part 1 items, exclud-
ing non-sensitive nuclear materials. The licens-
ing authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Before granting an export licence, it also takes care 
of NSG Government-to-Government Assurances. 
The ministry asks STUK’s opinion on all applica-
tions concerning NSG Part 1 items.
1.7 Control of nuclear 
material transport
The requirements for the transport of radioac-
tive material are set in the Finnish regulations 
on the transport of dangerous goods. The require-
ments are based on the IAEA Safety Standard 
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Material, SSR-6, and their purpose is to protect 
people, the environment and property from the 
harmful effects of radiation during the transport of 
radioactive material. Based on these regulations, 
STUK is the competent national authority for the 
regulatory control of the transport of radioactive 
material. 
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material and nuclear waste. Generally, a licence 
granted by STUK is needed for such a transport. 
Usually the transport licences are granted for a 
fixed period, typically a few years. A transport plan 
and a transport security plan approved by STUK 
are mandatory for each consignment of nuclear 
material or nuclear waste. A certificate of nuclear 
liability insurance must also be delivered to STUK 
before transportation. Furthermore, a package 
may be used for the transport of fissile nuclear 
material only after the package design has been 
approved by STUK.
1.8 Nuclear safeguards and security 
strengthen each other
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of radiation and nuclear safety, security and 
safeguards (3 S). All these three regimes have a 
common objective: the protection of people, society, 
the environment and future generations from the 
harmful effects of ionising radiation. As nuclear se-
curity aims to protect nuclear facilities’ sensitive/
classified information, nuclear material and other 
radioactive material from unlawful activities, it is 
clear that the majority of the activities that aim at 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear ma-
terials and sensitive nuclear technology contribute 
to nuclear security. Physical and information secu-
rity measures at nuclear facilities and for nuclear 
materials including technology, sensitive informa-
tion and knowledge also contribute to non-prolifer-
ation by providing deterrence, detection and delay 
of and response to nuclear security events. On the 
other hand, nuclear material accountancy and de-
tection measures may supplement security meas-
ures through a deterrence effect. 
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2 Safeguards activities in 2016
2.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
In 2016, STUK continued with national safeguards 
measures and activities with 97 inspection days 
and 43 inspections per material balance area as in 
the past. The stakeholders’ activities were licensed 
and inspected as appropriate, and inventory re-
ports and accountancies were verified systemically. 
The accumulation of nuclear material at the facili-
ties is shown in Figures 3 and 4 and the verified 
nuclear material inventories at the end of 2016 are 
shown in Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix 1. In particu-
lar in 2016, STUK safeguards inspections focused 
on the management systems and performance of 
safeguards within the licence holder’s organisa-
tion, which raises the number of STUK’s inspection 
days in Figures 5 and 6. 2016 was the first year 
when STUK included safeguards inspections in its 
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periodic inspection programme. These inspections 
are described in STUK’s annual report on regulato-
ry oversight on nuclear safety (Kainulainen, 2017).
In contrast to the high number of STUK inspec-
tion days, the number of the IAEA inspections 
was minimal, only 14 inspection person days. 
The implementation of the IAEA integrated safe-
guards since 2008 reduces the total number of an-
nual routine inspections days of the international 
inspectorates, but includes short-notice random 
inspections. Since 2010, the number of IAEA and 
European Commission inspections annually has 
been close to 20. The recent fluctuation has been 
due to the different design information verifica-
tion activities at the disposal site during each of 
the years. In 2016, the Commission considered the 
January technical meeting on encapsulation plant 
safeguards as a multi-person inspection, whereas 
the IAEA did not indicate that as an inspection, 
but triggered a Complementary Access to the site 
in April. There were no joint survey campaigns 
to verify the design information of the repository, 
which also led to small number of annual inspec-
tion days. Moreover, the adaption of remote data 
transfer at the power plants in 2014–2015 was suc-
cessful in avoiding one IAEA/EC ad hoc inspection 
during and an additional unexpected core opening 
in April 2016. The development of inspections and 
inspection person days per material balance area 
is presented in Figures 6 and 7. Inspections by 
STUK, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the European Commission in 2016 are 
presented in Appendix 2.
The implementation of safeguards in Finland 
was addressed at several meetings with the IAEA 
and the European Commission. During the IAEA 
General Conference in September 2016, a trilat-
eral meeting was organised in Vienna. A trilateral 
meeting at least once a year is a good forum for 
every organisation to discuss, share information 
and to clarify state declarations. In addition, STUK 
experts met IAEA officials to discuss actual topics 
like implementing State Level Concept at Finnish 
facilities in connection with other meetings or oc-
casions in Vienna in May and June. Similarly, in 
addition to the inspections STUK continued with 
two annual safeguards meetings with each of the 
NPP operator’s staff members responsible for safe-
guards.
2.2 General safeguards activities
2.2.1 Additional Protocol Declarations 
All licence holders sent their updated information 
about the sites for the national declaration, which 
is compiled by STUK, in time by 1 April. STUK 
submitted Finland’s annual Additional Protocol 
declaration updates to the IAEA on 13 May 2016 
as required. Additionally, STUK submitted the 
quarterly declarations on exports in February, May, 
August and November.
2.2.2 Approvals of new 
international inspectors
In 2016, a total of 12 IAEA and 10 Commission 
inspectors, newly appointed, were approved to per-
form inspections at nuclear facilities in Finland.
2.2.3 Nuclear dual‑use items, export licences 
In 2016, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 
22 export licences for NSG Part 1 items: one indi-
vidual licence for nuclear material and three for 
components to EU countries, three individual li-
cences and for exporting nuclear technology (nu-
clear information) for a nuclear power plant to 
EU countries, four licences to export software to 
Sweden (3) and the Russian Federation and train-
ing of nuclear software to the representatives of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2.2.4 Transport of nuclear materials
In 2016, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland 
from Germany, Sweden and the Russian Federation 
(Appendix 1, Table A1). In relation to these im-
ports, STUK approved four transport plans and 
two transport packaging designs. STUK inspected 
fresh nuclear fuel transports in accordance with 
the inspection plan, i.e. one inspection was carried 
out in 2016. 
2.2.5 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2016, TVO reported to STUK about its interna-
tional fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel ship-
ments. Based on the document inspection findings 
and audit of TVO’s international nuclear material 
transfer accountancy and control carried out on 27 
January and 2 December, STUK concluded that 
TVO has complied with its safeguards obligations 
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when purchasing the nuclear fuel and managing 
its international nuclear material transfers. The 
other operators purchase fuel as an end-product, 
and thus their accountancy does not need to cover 
the purchase chain abroad.
2.3 Safeguards implementation 
at the stakeholders
2.3.1 The Loviisa nuclear power plant
In 2016, STUK granted two import licences to 
Fortum for importing neutron flux sensors.
In total, STUK performed 10 safeguards in-
spections at the Loviisa NPP in 2016. Safeguards 
system inspection was carried out within STUK’s 
periodic inspection programme on 19–20 April. A 
routine refuelling outage of the Loviisa 1 reactor 
unit took place during the period 7 August – 14 
September 2016 and the outage of the Loviisa 
2 reactor unit during the period 17 September 
– 7 October 2016. STUK, the IAEA and the 
Commission performed a Physical Inventory 
Taking (pre-PIT) inspection before the outages, 
on 26–27 July 2016. Due to remote data trans-
mission, no extra cameras were needed during 
the outages. The Physical Inventory Verification 
(PIV) was carried out after the outage, on 19–20 
September 2016. STUK identified the fuel assem-
blies in the reactor cores and item-counted the 
fuel assemblies in the loading ponds. The Loviisa 
1 core was inspected on 3 September 2016 and the 
Loviisa 2 core on 24 September 2016. In addition 
to the PIV and the core controls, STUK carried out 
three routine inspections on its own. Three addi-
tional inspections, together with the IAEA and the 
Commission were carried out to perform activities 
that the international inspectors did not perform 
in the pre- and post PIV inspections.   
On the basis of its own assessment and that 
of the IAEA and of the Commission inspection re-
sults, STUK concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP 
complied with its nuclear safeguards obligations 
in 2016. 
In November, STUK performed FORK measure-
ments at the Loviisa spent fuel pond. In total, 39 
fuel elements and one dummy element were veri-
fied during the campaign.
2.3.2 The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
In 2016, STUK granted two import licences to TVO 
for importing fresh nuclear fuel to the two operat-
ing units, and the first import licence for importing 
fresh nuclear fuel for the initial core loading of unit 
Olkiluoto 3. TVO updated its nuclear materials 
handbook with the aim of improving the import 
control of dual-use items. The update was approved 
by STUK.
The Olkiluoto 1 reactor unit experienced an ad-
ditional outage in 10–16 April, 2016. During the 
outage, leaking fuel elements were removed from 
the reactor core. STUK performed an additional 
core verification inspection on 14 April. The refu-
elling and maintenance outage of the Olkiluoto 1 
reactor unit took place during the period 18 May 
– 6 June 2016, and that of the Olkiluoto 2 reactor 
unit during the period 6–17 May 2016. The PIV 
was carried out after the outage on 8–9 June 2016 
in the two reactor units and the spent fuel storage.
During the refuelling and maintenance outage, 
STUK identified the fuel assemblies in the reactor 
cores and inspected the loading ponds before the 
reactors were closed. The Olkiluoto 1 reactor was 
inspected on 4 June 2016 and the Olkiluoto 2 reac-
tor on 15 May 2016.
STUK carried out two additional routine in-
spections at the Olkiluoto site and the material 
balance areas at the Olkiluoto NPP. In the spent 
fuel storage, the ponds are covered with shielding 
plates preventing regular verification activities for 
the fuel elements in the ponds. Safeguards system 
inspection was carried within STUK’s periodic in-
spection programme on 13–15 September.
In Olkiluoto 3 unit, Euratom and STUK per-
formed a visit on 27 June with the purpose of 
preparing for the installation of surveillance equip-
ment. The annual design information verification 
inspection at the Olkiluoto 3 unit was carried out 
on 26 October 2016. At this inspection STUK as-
sessed TVO’s description of how to arrange the 
safeguards that are necessary to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons that was submitted 
according to Nuclear Energy Decree §36, subsec-
tion 8 in the operating licence application to the 
Government on 14 April 2017.
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In August 2016 STUK performed a Gamma 
burn-up verification (GBUV) measurement cam-
paign at the Olkiluoto NPP unit 1. During the 
campaign, 50 fuel elements were measured and 
verified as spent fuel. 
2.3.2 The Hanhikivi nuclear 
power plant project
The Government granted a Decision-in-Principle 
in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to con-
struct a new nuclear power plant at a new site. 
STUK initiated negotiations with the operators 
and the Commission as well as with the IAEA in 
2011 to prepare for the implementation of safe-
guards in good time simultaneously with the facil-
ity development. As a consequence, the company 
could request the vendor organisations to facili-
tate safeguards implementation; for example, to 
improve proliferation resistance and facilitate nu-
clear material verification and surveillance at the 
future plant. In the meantime, Fennovoima created 
an organisation for safeguards and prepared for 
the implementation of safeguards. 
One of the first steps in the construction pro-
cess is the control of nuclear technology, such as 
sensitive information obtained from the bidding 
companies. It was obvious that the first version of 
the nuclear materials handbook should focus on 
the current needs to control the nuclear technol-
ogy and dual-use equipment, so STUK approved 
Fennovoima’s safeguards manual “Fennovoima 
Managements System: Nuclear Materials Manual” 
as early as in 2014. 
Fennovoima submitted an annual safeguards 
report to STUK and the programme of activities 
for 2016 to STUK and the Commission, and the an-
nual safeguards report for 2015 with the planned 
safeguards activities for 2016–2017 to STUK. 
Fennovoima has announced that it will submit the 
Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) for the first 
time in 2017. The preliminary design information 
was already submitted in 2013 and updated in 
2015. Fennovoima applied for three licences for the 
export of nuclear information, which were granted 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016.
STUK carried out one safeguards inspection at 
Fennovoima’s premises in Salmisaari, Helsinki. It 
was performed to assess the company’s readiness 
to arrange safeguards for the construction of the 
new nuclear power plant. A follow-up inspection 
will be performed after Fennovoima has submit-
ted both the detailed plan on how the safeguards 
will be arranged in constructing and operating the 
NPP and the updated safeguards manual for the 
construction of the new NPP. After this follow-up 
inspection, STUK will prepare its statement about 
Fennovoima’s readiness to fulfil its safeguards ob-
ligations and requirements.   
Based on the meetings on the implementation 
of safeguards and the control of nuclear technol-
ogy with Fennovoima’s staff, STUK concludes that 
awareness and preparedness for safeguards proce-
dures are at an adequate level in the new organisa-
tion preparing for the new NPP project and that 
Fennovoima fulfilled its current safeguards obliga-
tions in 2016.
2.3.4 The VTT FiR1 research reactor
In 2016, the preparations for decommissioning the 
research reactor and those for the construction of 
the new nuclear safety research building contin-
ued at the Technical Research Centre of Finland, 
VTT. STUK and VTT responsible persons met once 
and discussed future actions to ensure appropriate 
safeguards procedures. The responsible manager 
retired during the year and a deputy took over 
the responsibilities, but the appointment of the 
new deputy was an open issue during the year. 
The small amounts of nuclear material used in the 
laboratories located in the reactor building will be 
moved to the new building once it has been com-
missioned. VTT submitted an application for the 
operating licence of the Nuclear Safety Centre in 
summer 2016. The licence based on the Nuclear 
Energy Act was granted by STUK in November 
2016, but the activities did not start in 2016. In fu-
ture, the aim is to have separate MBAs for the two 
separate VTT buildings with different activities. 
The same persons were appointed to be responsible 
for the safeguards at both installations and MBAs. 
Owing to small-size nuclear activities, these per-
sons did not need STUK’s approval for their duties 
at the Safety Centre. The site delimited according 
to the Additional Protocol currently covers only the 
reactor building. The VTT site will be updated as 
the materials and activities are moved to the new 
location. 
As a part of preparatory actions for the decom-
missioning of the research reactor, the spent fuel 
was inspected by the staff of the possible receiver, 
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the Idaho National laboratory. STUK made short 
visits to the two-week-long campaign. STUK and 
the Commission verified the nuclear material in-
ventory of VTT on 8 June 2016. STUK carried 
out a system inspection in November at VTT. The 
general safeguards procedures were inspected in-
cluding the responsibilities in the different areas 
at the research centre. The safeguards manuals 
for the R&D work, possession of safeguardable 
information, practices at the research reactor and 
the research building were assessed, and a few re-
quirements and recommendations were made with 
a deadline in early 2017.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that VTT complied with 
its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2016, al-
though there were some open requirements to be 
fulfilled in 2017. 
2.3.5 STUK
Together with the Commission, STUK Nuclear 
Materials Section verified the physical inventory, 
and inspected the site declaration and basic techni-
cal characteristics during the inspection on 9 June 
2016. The new safeguards manual was approved. It 
can be concluded that the operating unit at STUK 
fulfils the requirements for national safeguards ar-
rangements. 
2.3.6 University of Helsinki
In 2016, the University of Helsinki reorganised its 
internal structure. In that context STUK approved 
a new person as deputy to the safeguards responsi-
ble person of the renamed stakeholder, Department 
of Chemistry, University of Helsinki. The prem-
ises of the laboratory of radiochemistry were also 
renovated in autumn 2016. During the renova-
tion work, the nuclear materials were moved to a 
non-accessible storage. Before that, some materials 
considered as waste were sent to STUK. After the 
renovation work when the materials were returned 
to the laboratory premises, STUK carried out its 
inspection of the University of Helsinki site on 21 
December 2016 to verify the site, the BTC and the 
inventory. The update of the BTC was sent to the 
Commission immediately after the inspection.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the University of 
Helsinki complied with its nuclear safeguards obli-
gations in 2016.
2.3.7 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2016, STUK inspected the reports from the mi-
nor nuclear material holders. In addition, STUK 
granted licences to Aalto University and the 
Technical Research Centre to possess, handle, use 
and store nuclear materials in order to contin-
ue their activities. Responsible persons or their 
deputies were approved for Aalto University and 
Geological Survey of Finland.
The minor holders were requested to prepare 
their nuclear materials handbooks as required in 
the new STUK requirements, i.e. in the Guide YVL 
D.1. These handbooks or manuals were prepared 
during 2014, but the approval process continued in 
2015 and 2016. In total, 7 handbooks prepared by 
the minor holders were approved in 2016.
On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded 
that the minor nuclear material holders complied 
with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 2016, 
although in December 2016 STUK received a spe-
cial nuclear safeguards report from the University 
of Jyväskylä Department of Physics on a lost ura-
nium sample. The special report is still being re-
viewed, and the measures taken by the operator to 
prevent reoccurrence of the event will be assessed 
and inspected in 2017.
2.3.8 Front‑end fuel cycle operators
The operators at Harjavalta and Kokkola report 
monthly to the Commission and STUK. The ex-
traction of uranium from industrial purification 
processes is considered to be a pre-safeguard activ-
ity and therefore not subject to IAEA safeguards. 
With the entry into force of Guide YVL D.1 immi-
nent, the operators are preparing their procedures 
to meet the new requirements. In particular, the 
nuclear safeguards manual is to be incorporated 
into the quality managements systems. In 2016, 
STUK and the Commission inspected the inven-
tories and accountancy practices at both of the op-
erators. STUK approved the responsible person for 
safeguards at Harjavalta nickel refinery in 2016. 
On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded 
that these operators complied with their nuclear 
safeguards obligations in 2016.
During early 2011, STUK evaluated the li-
cence application of Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd to 
begin uranium production as a by-product at the 
Talvivaara nickel mine. In March 2012, the Finnish 
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Government granted a licence in accordance with 
the Finnish nuclear legislation to Talvivaara 
Sotkamo Ltd for the extraction of uranium from 
the Talvivaara mine. According to the licence con-
ditions, STUK must ensure that all relevant ar-
rangements are in place, including the nuclear 
safeguards manual and responsible persons for 
nuclear materials accountancy before the plant is 
commissioned. During 2011–2013, the uranium 
extraction plant was built as a new unit in the 
mineral processing complex. Progress in uranium 
extraction was halted in 2013 when the Supreme 
Administrative Court revoked the licence to ex-
tract uranium and, in 2014, Talvivaara Sotkamo 
Ltd filed for bankruptcy. In order to continue 
with the mining and milling operations, the state-
owned company Terrafame Mining Oy took over 
Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd in 2015. Representatives 
of the new stakeholder visited STUK in December 
2016 and presented their plans to continue with 
the uranium extraction plant. There were no safe-
guards activities at Talvivaara in 2016.
2.3.9 The disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel
The operator Posiva applied for the nuclear con-
struction licence for the disposal facility in 2012. 
STUK assessed the application during 2013–2015 
together with the Commission and the IAEA in 
order to clarify and facilitate safeguards measures 
for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 
The requirement document for the IAEA/EC equip-
ment to be installed in the encapsulation plant was 
prepared and finalised in 2014. This requirement 
document was referenced in the STUK assessment 
of the licence application. 
In 2015 Posiva updated the BTCs both for the 
encapsulation plant and the geological repository. 
In particular, the layout of the encapsulation plant 
was updated. As a consequence, the requirement 
document for the safeguards equipment to be in-
stalled at the encapsulation plant has to be updat-
ed by the IAEA and the Commission. The changes 
in the layout were discussed jointly in January at 
Posiva’s premises and in November 2016 at the 
IAEA. This “Safeguards-by-Design” process can 
be expected to continue during the progress of the 
facility. 
In June 2016 STUK performed a system inspec-
tion in order to assess Posiva’s preparedness to 
begin the construction of the disposal facility. A 
few requirements were set to update the manual 
in concordance with other STUK requirements 
for nuclear installations. Posiva updated its safe-
guards manual in autumn 2016 mainly to corre-
spond to the new phase of licensed construction 
and new reporting practices. STUK approved the 
update with some minor requirements on the re-
porting procedures. 
In December 2016, the operator Posiva launched 
the licensed construction of a disposal facility for 
nuclear fuel. This landmark, which transforms 
the ONKALO research project into the formal con-
struction of a nuclear facility was reached when ex-
cavation of access tunnels to the planned canister 
shaft began.
A new deputy for the responsible person for 
safeguards arrangements at the disposal facility 
was approved by STUK in August, but his position 
at Posiva ended shortly after. In December, Posiva 
submitted another new deputy for approval.
In 2016 STUK carried out two interim safe-
guards inspections at the site. The IAEA carried 
out a Complementary Assessment at the Posiva 
site on 13 April 2016. The underground construc-
tion for non-nuclear parts such as parking halls, 
personnel shafts, etc. continued during 2016. At 
ground level, the foundation works for the encap-
sulation plant were initiated. On the basis of its as-
sessment and inspection results, STUK concluded 
that Posiva complied with its nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2016.
2.3.10 Other stakeholders 
Research organisations and universities provided 
their annual declarations on research and devel-
opment work to STUK. After its review, STUK 
prepared the annual declaration based on the 
Additional Protocol to the IAEA within the agreed 
time limit (see 2.2.1 above). 
In December 2016, STUK received a special 
safeguards report from RAOS Project Oy, the 
Hanhikivi plant designer, on the unauthorised 
import of nuclear information. The report is under 
review, and measures have been taken by stake-
holders to prevent reoccurrence of this kind of 
events in future.
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3 Development work in 2016
3.1 Development of working practices 
Nuclear materials safeguards implemented by the 
Nuclear Materials Section of STUK cover all typi-
cal measures of the State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and 
many other activities besides. Nuclear safeguards 
on the national level are closely linked with the 
other functions of nuclear materials control and 
non-proliferation: licensing, export control, bor-
der control, transport control, combating illic-
it trafficking, the physical protection of nuclear 
materials, and monitoring compliance with the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
The continuous analysis of the developments in the 
involved fields of both technology and politics is a 
daily, multidisciplinary task in the STUK Nuclear 
Materials Section. 
In 2016, the main internal development task in 
the Safeguards Section was the renewal of the nu-
clear material data base maintained at STUK. The 
database has been moved from a Microsoft Access 
platform to Microsoft SQL Server with a new web-
based user interface. The work has been performed 
as an in-house project, utilising database and 
programming experts from STUK’s Department 
of Environmental Radiation Surveillance and 
Emergency Preparedness. At the end of 2016, 
the project was not yet finished, so it will con-
tinue into 2017.  In parallel with this, the quality 
management system, in particular the standard 
operational procedures at the Reactor Regulation 
and Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation de-
partments of STUK were under revision. At the 
Nuclear Materials Section the updates included 
the revision of current procedures that were in-
cluded in several documents and the adoption of 
the new database. The issuance of these proce-
dures is also delayed to 2017. 
As the licensed construction of the disposal be-
gan in 2016, the preparatory work at the authority 
must be focused on timely implementation of safe-
guards, in particular the equipment infrastructure 
to be fitted to the encapsulation and disposal pro-
cess. The development of the passive gamma emis-
sion tomography continued in cooperation with na-
tional experts at Helsinki Institute of Physics and 
also within the support programme to the IAEA. 
A meeting between the Operator’s experts and 
safeguards staff, STUK, Commission and the IAEA 
was also held in January in Olkiluoto at Posiva’s 
premises. STUK reserved additional resources for 
the cooperation.
3.2 Support programme to 
the IAEA safeguards
The Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA 
Safeguards (FINSP) is financed by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and coordinated by STUK. The 
FINSP was established in May 1988. In 2016, 
FINSP was active in the areas of verification meth-
od development, development of safeguards guid-
ance to the IAEA Member States and in inspector 
training. 
A NDA verification method, Passive Gamma 
Emission Tomography (PGET), has been under de-
velopment by support programmes of USA, Sweden 
and the European Commission. In the task FIN 
A 1997” Passive Gamma Emission Tomography 
System Implementation Support” FINSP support-
ed IAEA in upgrading the detectors for the fast-
er read-out of data. The measurement campaign 
preparations were in progress at the end of 2016. 
Figure 7 presents testing of the equipment.
Under the task Member State Support to 
IAEA Outreach Events on the SIP Guides, FIN 
B 2095, the experts of STUK assisted the IAEA 
in making IAEA Topical Guidance on Safeguards 
Implementations known to the Member States. In 
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2016, IAEA organised outreach events with a wide 
audience all around the world. The events were 
held as follows:
•	 “Use	 of	 the	 Safeguards	 Implementation	 Prac-
tices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining 
State Safeguards Infrastructure”, Vienna,15–19 
February 2016
•	 “Use	 of	 the	 Safeguards	 Implementation	 Prac-
tices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification 
Activities”, Vienna 5–7 April 2016.
FINSP has also organised NDA training for 
the IAEA inspectors. A Spent Fuel Verification 
Training Course was held at the Loviisa NPP on 31 
October – 3 November 2016, with the support and 
cooperation of the NPP operator Fortum (Fig. 8). 
Disposal programmes for spent 
nuclear fuel and the ASTOR group
The programmes for a geological repository for 
spent nuclear fuel in Sweden and Finland have 
reached the licensing phase, and the safeguards 
measures must be agreed on by all parties: fa-
cility designers, operators and the inspectorates. 
The implementation of safeguards measures 
has been discussed at several fora. The Experts’ 
Group Application of Safeguards to Geological 
Repositories (ASTOR) held its annual meeting in 
the US hosted by the NRC on 22–25 April 2016 as 
a joint Support Programme task. The main aim 
was to report and summarise the achievements 
obtained during the 10-year period of the ASTOR 
group. Several topical groups provided the IAEA 
with their draft reports mainly on potential meth-
ods that can be applied to safeguard geological 
repositories. The practical implementation was 
discussed with the Finnish operator at a meet-
ing at the operator’s premises in January and at 
the EPGR meeting in Vienna. Moreover, the dis-
posal of spent fuel requires that safety, data se-
curity and other security arrangements and the 
safeguards required to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons must be properly implemented at 
a national level.  For this purpose, STUK launched 
GOSSER (Geological Disposal Safeguards and 
Security) to finalise the Finnish concept for safe-
guarding the geological disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel. GOSSER gathers together the necessary ac-
tions that have been done and that still need to be 
done to develop the cost-effective and functional 
safeguards concepts for the encapsulation plant 
and for the geological repository. The project coordi-
nates the activities between the IAEA Safeguards 
Support Programme including the ASTOR group, 
the safeguards implementation plans of the IAEA, 
the European Commission and STUK, and main-
tains the cooperation between STUK’s safety, secu-
rity and safeguards sections.
Figure 7. Testing of the tomograph to image the target 
consisting of cobalt rods positioned in an IAEA shape. 
The result is visible on the screen.
Figure 8. IAEA inspector course participants in Loviisa 
in November 2016.
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3.3 International cooperation 
and services
The state’s regulatory authority plays an impor-
tant role in implementing safeguards at a national 
level, and also in contributing to and participating 
in the international fora to share experiences and 
interact with other parties. Participating in inter-
national events with a suitable contribution is also 
the best training for safeguards inspectors. The 
resources are limited, so the selection of the events 
is important.
 STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has appointed Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and in several working groups. A STUK expert con-
tinued with the chairmanship of the Verification 
Technologies and Methodologies (VTM) Working 
Group. STUK experts also provided a few presen-
tations at the INMM annual meeting.
STUK keeps in close contact with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological 
repositories is strengthening cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden. In 2016, STUK and SSM re-
voked the traditional bilateral annual meetings in 
the framework of nuclear non-proliferation.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts 
have contributed to the IAEA’s international mis-
sions. The current experience obtained from the 
planning, design and construction of new nuclear 
facilities in Finland has increased the number of 
requests to participate in different kinds of inter-
national cooperation. 
In 2014, the partnership programme between 
King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable 
Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
and STUK was launched. The initiative is to give 
expert support to the establishment of the nuclear 
regulatory authority in Saudi Arabia. In the field 
of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safe-
guards and security experts carry out practical 
cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE. In 
the end of 2016, K.A.CARE and STUK agreed on 
continuation of the programme.
In 2016, two EU-funded projects were launched 
to give support to the nuclear regulators in 
Vietnam and Tanzania as these countries are aim-
ing at nuclear power and uranium mining, respec-
tively. The kick-off meetings were held in 2016 and 
the cooperation is scheduled to continue for at least 
2–3 years.
In order to facilitate and ease the contracting 
of commercial services of the authority organisa-
tion STUK, a new company STUK International 
Ltd. was founded in 2016 as the memorandum 
and articles of association were approved by the 
Government on 17 November 2016. The limited 
liability company is wholly owned by the State of 
Finland. STUK International Ltd provides project 
management services and purchases the relevant 
subject expertise from outsourced providers. It 
also provides expert services to improve nuclear 
and radiation safety and engages in research and 
development in the field. The expertise will mainly 
be sourced from STUK but can also be supplied by 
other sector providers.
3.4 GICNT – Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 
founded in 2006, is a voluntary partnership of 86 
nations, 5 official observers, and co-chaired by the 
Russian Federation and the United States. The 
GICNT mission is to strengthen the global capac-
ity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear ter-
rorism by conducting multilateral activities that 
strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and 
interoperability of partner nations. The GICNT 
plenary meetings are organised every two years. 
At these meetings, the work programme for the 
coming two years is agreed. The previous plenary 
meeting was held in Helsinki in June 2015. At this 
meeting, Finland was elected to take the chair-
manship of the Nuclear Detection Working Group 
(NDWG).
In 2016, the work has progressed as planned. 
In January 2016, NDWG held a technical meet-
ing in Helsinki. In February, NDWG supported 
GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group 
in a multilateral exercise in Abu Dhabi, United 
Arab Emirates. GICNT’s Implementation and 
Assessment Group meeting was held in Sydney, 
Australia in May. In 2016, GICNT celebrated its 
10th anniversary. A meeting in honour of this was 
held at The Hague, the Netherlands in June 2016. 
In the autumn, a multilateral table-top-exercise 
was held in Bucharest, Romania. In addition to 
GICNT events, the NDWG also made contribu-
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tions in other forums: 1) at the INTERPOL Global 
Counter Nuclear Smuggling Conference, January 
2016, 2) at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
(JAEA) International Symposium on Technology 
Development for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Nuclear Security, October 2016, and 3) at the IAEA 
Nuclear Security Conference, December 2016. 
3.5 IPNDV – International 
Partnership for Nuclear 
Disarmament Verification
International Partnership for Nuclear Dis-
armament Verification (IPNDV) was established on 
the initiative of the United States in 2014. IPNDV’s 
first plenary meeting was held in Washington DC 
in March 2015. The main outcome of the meeting 
was the establishment of three working groups:
1) Monitoring and Verification Objectives
2) On-site Inspections
3) Technical Challenges and Solutions.
Finland participates in the work of all groups. In 
November 2015, the second plenary meeting was 
held in Oslo, Norway. It was agreed that over the 
next 18 months IPNDV would concentrate on the 
verification of the disassembly of nuclear weap-
ons. This has been the primary focus of work in 
2016. The dismantling process was split into mul-
tiple steps by Working Group 2. Based on its work, 
Working Group 3 (WG3) identified a number of 
technologies potentially applicable during different 
dismantling phases. Reviews from the identified 
technologies have been written by participating 
WG3 experts. Finland drafted two technology pa-
pers in 2016. After completing the papers, the final 
assay on the applicability of different technologies 
to different tasks was done. This work continues in 
2017. In order to complete the work in time during 
2016, two plenary sessions in Tokyo and Abu Dhabi 
and two working group meetings in Geneva were 
held.
3.6 Radiation monitoring at 
border crossing stations
STUK and Finnish Customs continued the joint 
project for the radiation border monitoring of 
Finnish border-crossing stations. The upgrading 
project, RADAR, is now changing its form and the 
work continues as a maintenance process, which is 
continuing for the time being. Major investments 
were made in 2015, but the delivery of the detec-
tors took place in early 2016. Long-term mainte-
nance contracts needed for sustaining the systems 
will be signed in the near future. In 2015, much 
effort was put into the development of IT infra-
structure and analysis methods, which will make 
it possible to implement national nuclear detection 
architecture. The data analysis of spectrometric 
detectors from different locations is now carried 
out automatically at the headquarters of STUK. 
Moreover, STUK experts have the necessary tools 
at their disposal to provide support to the frontline 
officers in real time and based on accurate infor-
mation from the radiation measurements. The ar-
chitecture serves both fixed installations and mo-
bile devices. In 2016, Customs officers were trained 
in actual work scenarios (Figure 9).
Figure 9. Training of Customs officers at a mock-up 
border crossing station.
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4 National Data Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty (FiNDC)
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear test explosions in 
any environment. This ban is aimed at constrain-
ing the development and the qualitative improve-
ment of nuclear weapons, including the develop-
ment of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New York on 24 September 1996. It will en-
ter into force after it has been ratified by the 44 
states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states par-
ticipated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or 
research reactors. 
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. 
The verification regime consists of the following 
elements: the International Monitoring System 
(IMS), a consultation and clarification process, 
on-site inspections and confidence-building meas-
ures. The IMS is almost 90% ready, and is pro-
viding data from almost 300 measuring stations 
all over the world to more than 1,200 organisa-
tions in more than 120 countries. In addition 
to monitoring compliance with the treaty, the 
data from the IMS is used in disaster mitiga-
tion. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO) is actively providing data 
to the global Tsunami Warning System and, since 
2012, the CTBTO has been a member of the Inter-
Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear 
Emergencies (IACRNE) and a co-sponsor of the 
Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of 
the International Organisations (JPLAN) led by 
the IAEA. Within this framework, the CTBTO is 
responsible for gathering and providing close to re-
al-time radionuclide monitoring data to the IAEA 
and other participating organisations. 
Finland signed the CTBT on its day of opening 
in 1996 and ratified it less than three years later. 
In addition to complying with the basic require-
ment of the CTBT of not carrying out any nuclear 
weapons tests, Finland actively takes part in the 
development of the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national 
authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK 
has two roles: it operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the 16 radionu-
clide laboratories in the IMS (RL07). The most 
important task of the FiNDC is to inspect data re-
ceived from IMS and inform the national authority 
about any indications of a nuclear test explosion. 
The radionuclide laboratory contributes to the 
IMS by providing support in radionuclide analyses 
and in quality control of the radionuclide station 
network. The third major national collaborator is 
the Institute of Seismology at the University of 
Helsinki, which runs an IMS seismology station 
(PS17 in Lahti) and provides analysis of waveform 
IMS data.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) Status (31 December 2016)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 183
•	 Total	Ratifications	 166
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 36
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4.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
In 2016, the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WGB is a policy-making 
organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise 
to the CTBTO, while also attending to Finnish na-
tional interests. 
4.2 The analysis pipeline is a well‑
established daily routine
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The analysis pipe-
line is linked to the LINSSI database and equipped 
with an automated alarm system, to enable ef-
ficient and fully automated screening of the data. 
The IMS network is still developing, and the num-
ber of installed air filter stations was 67 at the end 
of 2016 (in the final stage there will be 80).
The number of IMS stations equipped with ra-
dioxenon measurement capabilities was 30 at the 
end of 2016. 25 IMS radioxenon systems were certi-
fied by the CTBTO at the end of 2016. Radioxenon 
measurements are especially important for CTBT 
verification, because xenon, as a noble gas, may 
also leak from underground tests, which seldom 
release particulate matter. The operational sta-
tions generated more than 1,000 gamma and beta-
gamma spectra per day for the FiNDC analysis 
pipeline to handle. The pipeline is well-established 
and has been running stably for many years. 
4.3 Two DPRK nuclear tests 
detected in 2016
In 2016, DPRK performed two underground nu-
clear tests at their Punggue-ri test site. One on 
6 January and a second on 9 September. Both 
tests were registered within minutes and iden-
tified as possible tests by Seismic monitoring 
both in Finland and at the PTS of the CTBTO. 
FiNDC participated in the clarification of the situ-
ation during the first hours and days after the 
tests and produced information bulletins to the 
Finnish Government based on information from 
the Institute of Seismology, the CTBTO and public 
sources. The CTBTO in Vienna reported on the 
September test before it was announced by DPRK, 
which proves the ability of the IMS system to de-
tect unannounced nuclear tests. FiNDC closely fol-
lowed radionuclide detections in IMS radionuclide 
stations close to DPRK after both tests but no ra-
dionuclides were detected in the IMS system that 
could be proven to originate from either of these 
tests. However, about 40 days after the January 
test, there was a series of Xenon detections in IMS 
stations that might be attributed to a late release 
from the test site. This would be a similar, but 
weaker, case to detections made after the 2013 
DPRK test. 
Xenon radioisotopes released from medical iso-
tope production facilities and NPPs are regularly 
measured all around the globe. Anthropogenic 
nuclides with CTBT relevance, mainly 99Tc, 131I 
from medical isotope production and 137Cs from 
Chernobyl and Fukushima fallout are regularly 
measured at some particulate stations.
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5 Summary
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures and activities with 98 inspection days and 
43 inspections. Since 2010, the number of IAEA 
and European Commission inspections annually 
has been close to 20. The implementation of the 
IAEA integrated safeguards since 2008 in force 
in Finland reduces the total number of annual 
routine inspections days of the international in-
spectorates, but includes short-notice random in-
spections. In order to be present at all of the short-
notice IAEA inspections, STUK has had a daily 
on-call inspector. 
In 2016, STUK performed 29 safeguards inspec-
tions on the material balance areas of the Finnish 
nuclear power plants (NPP), 10 at the Loviisa NPP 
and 19 at the Olkiluoto NPP. At each of the major 
operators, one of the inspections was a multi-
day multi-inspector system inspection resulting in 
the high number of inspection days. According to 
the state-level approach for Finland, three short-
noticed random inspection were carried out, two 
at Olkiluoto unit 1 and one at the Olkiluoto spent 
fuel storage, and one complementary access to the 
Olkiluoto disposal site. STUK performed one non-
destructive assay measurement campaign at both 
NPPs. At other facilities, the Commission took part 
in the accountancy inspection and physical inven-
tory verification of uranium residuals in Kokkola 
and Harjavalta industrial plants and physical 
inventory verifications at the VTT research reac-
tor and at STUK. The total number of safeguards 
inspections in 2016 was 43 for STUK, 18 for the 
Commission, and 12 for the IAEA. The IAEA 
sent its safeguards statements to the Commission, 
which amended them with its own conclusions 
and forwarded them to STUK. The conclusions by 
the Commission were in line with the IAEA’s re-
marks as well as with STUK’s own findings; there 
were no outstanding questions by the IAEA or the 
Commission at the end of 2016.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards in-
spection activities continued to demonstrate that 
the Finnish licence holders take good care of their 
nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities, and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the stakeholders’ declarations. Neither the IAEA 
nor the Commission made any remarks, nor did 
they present any required actions based on their 
inspections. By means of their nuclear materials 
accountancy and control systems, the stakeholders 
enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under 
the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards and non-proliferation. 
In 2016, STUK’s Nuclear Materials Section 
cooperated closely with the IAEA in order to share 
experiences and train authorities’ staff in countries 
that are aiming at nuclear programmes, i.e. urani-
um production or nuclear energy. This context was 
enlarged to Tanzania and Vietnam in EU-financed 
projects. The cooperation with Saudi Arabia contin-
ued in 2016. 
A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related activities 
is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach 
this goal, major steps must be taken in the political 
arena, and an important prerequisite for positive 
political action is that the verification system of 
the CTBTO is functioning and able to provide as-
surance to all parties that it is impossible to make 
a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The 
FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common 
endeavour so that the verification system of the 
CTBTO can accomplish its detection task. While 
still incomplete, the verification system has clearly 
demonstrated its ability to detect nuclear tests, as 
unfortunately this could be done twice in 2016.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement 
concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear 
(such as in “protective 
measures taken against 
CBRN weapons or hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
EPGR
Encapsulation Plant and 
Geological Repository
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment 
according to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with 
gross gamma and neutron 
detection
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
High-enriched uranium, 20% 
or more of U-235
HPGe
High-Purity Germanium
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IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
ITU
Institute of Transuranium 
Elements in Karlsruhe
INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, e.g. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
INMM
Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management
IPNDV
International Partnership 
for Nuclear Disarmament 
Verification
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working Group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive 
materials
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium, less 
than 20% of U-235
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEAE
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission
OECD/NEA
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development /Nuclear 
Energy Agency
Onkalo
Underground rock 
characterisation facility (for 
the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel)
PGET
Passive Gamma Emission 
Tomography
PIT
Physical Inventory Taking
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory 
in the CTBT IMS network 
hosted by STUK (FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
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SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced 
inspection, complementary 
access, on-call inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the 
CTBTO)
YVL Guide
Regulatory Guide on Nuclear 
Safety (STUK requirements 
on safety, security and 
safeguards, in Finnish 
Ydinvoimalaitosohje)
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Table A1. Summary of nuclear fuel receipts in 2016.
To From FA LEU (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 Germany 90 15 628
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 (1/2) Sweden 100 17 469
Loviisa NPP, WL0V Russian Federation 168 21 092
 FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium. 
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2016
Table A2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2016.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 1 094/511 187 291 815
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 1 110/546 186 562 845
Olkiluoto, spent fuel 
storage, W0LS
7 704/7 704 1 219 791 11044
Loviisa NPP, WL0V 5 979/5 197 696 091 6 630
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) Fuel assemblies (FA) in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 FAs and Olkiluoto NPP 500 FAs per reactor)
Table A3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2016.
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U* (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 187 291 – 815 –
W0L2 – 186 562 – 1845 –
W0LS – 1 291 065 – 10 979 –
WL0V – 696 091 – 6 498 –
WRRF 1 509.298 60.096 0.001 < 0.001 0.044
WFRS 1.842 0.537 396.3 0.010 2.370
WKK0 2 709.700 – – – –
WNNH 3 588.070 – – – –
WHEL 10.826 0.294 0.005 0.002 1.0678
Minor holders 0.907 0.00116 1 158.6 ~ 0  0.291
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT  Research Reactor, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = Freeport Cobalt Oy, in Kokkola, WNNH = Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta,  
WHEL = Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 Safeguards field activities in 2016
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA/Location Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
TVO HQ 27 January Audit of International NM transfers, accountancy and control 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LE 27 January Posiva technical meeting 0 1 1 0 6 1
WL0V 17 February Internal transfers of spent fuel, Site check 0 0 2 0 0 2
W0L1 17 February Fresh fuel receipt inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1 18 February RII 1 1 1 1 1 1
Posiva site SSFPOS1 13 April Complementary access 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1 14 April Core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 19–20 April SG system inspection 0 0 1 0 0 4
W0L1, W0L2 26–27 April Pre-PIT 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0L2 15 May Core verification 0 0 1 0 0 2
WKK0 31 May PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
WNNH 1 June PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
W0L1 4 June Core verification 0 0 1 0 0 2
Posiva 6–8 June SG system inspection 0 0 1 0 0 9
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 8–9 June Post-PIT/PIV/DIV 3 3 3 3 3 3
WRRF 8 June PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
WFRS 9 June PIV 0 1 1 0 1 3
WL0V 14 June Fresh fuel receipt inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
W0L3 27 June OL3 camera, seal & cabinet engineering 0 1 1 0 1 1
W0LF 29 June Interim inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LS 19 July RII 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 26–27 July Pre-PIT 1 1 1 2 2 2 
WL0V 15 August Cask verification at LO1 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1 31 August RII 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 3 September LO1 Core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
TVO 13–15  September SG system inspection 0 0 1 0 0 9
WL0V 24 September LO2 Core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 19–20 October PIV, Post-PIT 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0L3 26 October DIV and system inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
W0LF 27 October Interim inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
Fennovoima 24–25 October SG system inspection 0 0 1 0 0 6
VTT 21 and 23 October SG system inspection 0 0 1 0 0 6
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 23 November Interim inspection 0 0 3 0 0 3
TVO HQ 2 December Audit of international NM transfers, accountancy and control 0 0 1 0 0 1
WHEL 21 December Interim inspection (PIV) 0 0 1 0 0 1
NDA MEASUREMENTS
W0L1 16–19 August GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 13
WL0V 28–30 November FORK 0 0 1 0 0 6
TOTAL 12 18 43 14 25 98
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CV = Core Verification,  
ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay, RII = Random Interim Inspection.
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APPENDIX 3 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements con-
cerning safeguards of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear items in Finland (Finnish Treaty Series, 
FTS):
Treaties and international organisations 
in which Finland is a party:
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 
adopted in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 
July 1968 (1970), INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 March 
1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	 the	 list	 in	At-
tachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	Eur-
atom Treaty, on determining concentrations of 
ores, 2 February 1960.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (FTS 
15/2001). This Treaty was ratified by Finland on 
January 15, 1999, but will not enter into force be-
fore it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II 
of the Treaty.
International Atomic Energy Agency (since 1958).
Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (since 1976).
International Energy Agency (since 1992). 
Safeguards Agreements based on 
Non-Proliferation Treaty:
The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in Implementation of Article III, (1) and 
(4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 1973. 
Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
The Protocol Additional to the Agreement between 
the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the 
Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 
the Kingdom of Netherlands, the Portuguese 
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of 
Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
Implementation of Article iii, (1) and (4) of the 
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
22 September 1998. Entered into force on 30 April 
2004.
Finland is party among others to the 
following international conventions (the 
year when the convention entered into 
force for Finland is given in brackets):
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material; opened for signature in Vienna and New 
York on 3 March 1980 (1989).
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear 
Accident; opened for signature in Vienna on 26 
September 1986 (1987).
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency; opened for 
signature in Vienna on 26 September 1986 (1990).
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy; adopted in Paris on 29 July 1960 
(1972).
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Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention 
of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear Energy; adopted in Brussels on 31 
January 1963 (1977).
Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field 
of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material; adopted 
in Brussels on 17 December 1971 (1991).
The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application 
of the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention; 
adopted in Vienna on 21 September 1988 (1995).
Convention on Nuclear Safety; opened for signa-
ture in Vienna on 20 September 1994 (1996).
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management, adopted on 29 September 
1997 in Vienna (2001).
Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement 
in Connection with Radiation Accidents; adopted 
in Vienna on 17 October 1963 (1965) Agreement on 
common Nordic guidelines on communications con-
cerning the siting of nuclear installations in border 
areas; adopted on 15 November 1976 (1976).
The Agreement between Finland and Sweden on 
the guidelines to be followed while exporting nu-
clear material, technology or equipment, 4 March 
1983 (FTS 20/1983).
Agreements relating to early notification of nu-
clear events and exchange of information on 
safety of nuclear facilities with Denmark (1987), 
Norway (1987), Sweden (1987), Germany (1993), 
the Russian Federation (1996) and Ukraine (1996).
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessments 
in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991)
As of 1 January 1995, Finland has 
been a member of the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or 
Euratom). Consequently, the following 
agreements are applied in Finland:
The Agreement between the Government of 
Republic of Finland and the Government of 
Canada and Canada concerning the uses of nu-
clear materials, equipment, facilities and infor-
mation transferred between Finland and Canada 
(FTS 43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent 
by the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 
6 October 1959, as amended.
The Agreement between the Government of Republic 
of Finland and the Government of Australia con-
cerning the transfer of nuclear material between 
Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). Substituted to the 
appropriate extent by the Agreement between the 
Government of Australia and the European Atomic 
Energy Community ty concerning transfer of nucle-
ar material from Australia to the European Atomic 
Energy Community, 21 September 1981.
The Agreement for Cooperation with the 
Government of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic Energy 
Community and the USA, 12 April 1996.
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy Between the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the Government of Japan, 
27 February 2006.
The Agreement Between the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the Cabinet of Ministers 
of Ukraine for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy, 28 April 2005.
The Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the Government 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 4 December 2006.
Bilateral Safeguards Agreements 
made by Finland:
The Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Korea and the Government of the 
Republic of Finland for Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy, entered into force on 
1.1.2015 (FTS 5/2015).
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APPENDIX 3 InternatIonal agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards In fInland
The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Finland for Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy, entered into force on 
6.4.2015 (FTS 32/2015).
The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
the Government of the Republic of Finland entered 
into force on 3.6.2017 (FTS 48/2017).
The Agreement with the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III and X expired 
on 20 February 1999.
The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) and 
the Government of the Republic of Finland for Co-
operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
(FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 expired on 
1.12.2004.
The Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the 
Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 41/70). Articles 
1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
The Agreement on implementation of the 
Agreement with Finland and Canada concerning 
the uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland and 
Canada (FTS 43/84).
